Monday, October 19, 2009

A Perspective on Afghanistan

After embarking on a campaign to be more informed about current events through more in-depth reading and analysis, it feels like the right time to reenter the blogosphere. Typing thoughts instead of just talking about them in a disorganized way helps to bring positions together with much more completeness and clarity. On that note, it's time to consider the war in Afghanistan.

Background
Afghanistan rests in a historically volatile area in Central Asia. Subject to Soviet power politics, it became the center of a proxy conflict in the Cold War. The United States facilitated the rise of the anti-Soviet government, who launched a radical Islamic campaign in the state. Al Qaeda found a safe haven in the area, and became enmeshed in Afghanistan and the Taliban government. After 9/11, it was only logical to pursue the Taliban/Al Qaeda link to undermined global terrorist networks. Therefore, the war in Afghanistan began.

Now it's time to dispel myth number one about the Afghan war. The citation of time as a factor in supporting withdrawal is a fallacious one. The much-heralded troop "surge" in Afghanistan would have increased the number of troops in Afghanistan from just 30,000 to 60,000. Consider that American forces in Iraq were consistently at four times or more of the level of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The key point is that Afghanistan has never been a large-scale conflict, and that it cannot be defined in terms of a record-length war that in itself justifies withdrawal. As the Economist aptly put it in the most recent edition: "The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars."

Strategic inconsistency and deprioritization characterized the first seven or so years of the Afghan war. Therefore, it is important to consider that when understanding the current direction of Afghan policy, the "war" has been much more of fragmentary conflict across the country since 2001. The Al Qaeda and Taliban link is also an important factor to keep in mind.

Why We Fight
The Afghan war never received the criticism of aggressive neoconservative foreign policy that the Iraq war grew to receive. Legitimate justification exists for the presence of American forces in Afghanistan, before the debate on future strategy even begins. Understanding why the United States has fought in Afghanistan is key to understanding what to do next.

First, the rise of Western globalism triggered reactionary movements such as Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups that sought to destabilize the new world order they saw emerging. Firmly attached to radical Islamic ideology, these groups justified their pursuit of power via terrorism. In this sense, terrorism is one of the many flashpoints of conflict that occur over time when a power structure changes, in this case the monolithic American power. However, terrorism exists much more intangibly that the geopolitical conflict that characterized earlier international conflict. Because of the intangible and psychological power of terrorism, (some terrorists operate in the name of Al Qaeda without any connection to the actual organization) destroying it entirely is not possible.

However, the primary justification for American presence in Afghanistan comes from the need to deconstruct global terrorist networks to prevent the unification of the anti-Western ideological movements that seek to undermine security of all nations. Furthermore, Central Asian security itself depended on eliminating entrenched and organized terrorist groups, as Pakistan's conflict in its frontier regions demonstrates.

Another impetus for the American presence in Afghanistan is that of the drug trade. While only a minimal link between opium production in Afghanistan and Western Hemisphere drug operations exists, the 90% of world poppy plants that come from Afghanistan further threatens regional security. Myanmar's security is just one example. The illicit narcotics trade funds organized crime around Asia, and thus destablizes governments and undoes social order.

For the global humanitarian interest, the Taliban government undermined the well-being of the Afghan people through economic backwardness. The CIA World Factbook cites:
"Afghanistan's economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Real GDP growth exceeded 7% in 2008...It will probably take the remainder of the decade and continuing donor aid and attention to significantly raise Afghanistan's living standards from its current level, among the lowest in the world."

Only through some foreign intervention, whether military or not, could this be solved.

What We Must Do
Complete withdrawal from Afghanistan is out of the question, for the aforementioned reasons and context. However, a legitimate debate is broiling in Washington about what policy direction to take. Indicating political pragmatism and centrism, President Obama found more support with Republican lawmakers over Afghan policy than Democrats. The recent policy review with the complex interaction of the President, Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Clinton, and General McChrystal opens the debate over a counterinsurgency policy versus sustained military action.

Counterinsurgency options involve carefully removing individual targets to destory resistance hierarchies. This policy assumes that by removing Al Qaeda leadership from the equation, the security threat from Afghanistan will diminish. Advanced military technology could accomplish this, evoking thoughts of Tony Stark and Iron Man awesomeness.

Based on the previous contextual assessment of Afghanistan, this policy does not hold water. Removing leadership and key terrorist figures would not solve the larger problems that make Afghanistan more unstable and prone to being a security threat. For this reason and ones to be listed, my personal viewpoint is that the United States should make an effort to pursue a cohesive strategy to eliminate all vestiges of Al Qaeda in the region in the short term, and eliminate any future tendency for the Afghans to return to radical dependence by improving the country's economy, restructuring the agricultural sector away from poppy farming, and working to eliminate widespread corruption in the Afghan political and tribal system.

First, eliminating Al Qaeda's organizational capabilities will do the most towards hindering terrorism in the region. This policy is agreed upon even in Vice President Biden's policy proposals. However, the main distinction comes in the ensuing proposals.

Preventive practices are by far preferable to remedial short-term solutions. Therefore, avoiding any future repeats of pre-2001 Afghanistan is vitally important. In order to accomplish this, the economy must be improved, and a basic standard of living and human rights encouraged among the population. This policy will remove the ideological ground radical groups can use to attract locals to be sympathizers to their cause.

Furthermore, Afghanistan must be weaned from poppy farming. The Taliban feeds on poppy farming, and keeps the rural poor as sympathetic through buying what a legitimate government would not. Only through a widespread effort to educate farmers and provide new crops and diverse sources of agricultural livelihood aside from poppy production will the United States succeed in destablizing the funding and entrenchment of the security threats in Afghanistan, for the Taliban as it exists today operates closely with Al Qaeda.

Finally, eliminating corruption in the Afghan political system must occur in order to promote a fair government and cooperation among rival groups that will allow for the functioning of a state. Hamid Karzai clearly either oversaw or allowed the rigging of the national elections recently, pushing the numbers to ensure his ultimate retention of power. Honest oversight of the elections and assessment of the structure and origins of Afghan politicians will go a long way towards preventing future security problems.

Hitches?
Pakistan is an important consideration in Afghan policy as well. With an overbearing military that often controls the civilian government, the United States must be sensitive to Pakistani moves to fight terrorism on its own soil. The recent initiative in South Waziristan shows promise. This alliance and coordination must be maintained in order to achieve success in the above goals. India must also be indirectly considered in the Pakistan front as well.

The main knock on this outlined course of action is practicality. A large commitment of resources is necessary to attain the goals of security and preventive policy. However, with a solid strategy, effective leadership, and international cooperation in all areas, not just military, will help with a cohesive and effective solution to the Afghan conflict.

The United Nations has outlined many of these goals already, and will continue to work for their completion. The international community must commit to solving Afghan problems, for no half-hearted efforts will be enough to maintain the peace and security necessary in Central Asia.